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We analyze a one-shot experiment on the traveler’s dilemma in which members of
the Game Theory Society, were asked to submit both a (possibly mixed) strategy and
their belief concerning the average strategy of their opponents. Very few entrants
expect and play the unique Nash equilibrium, while we observe a ﬁfth playing the co-
operative solution of the game, i.e. a strictly dominated strategy. The experimental
data suggest to analyze the game as one of incomplete information. Most strategies
observed are in the support of its Bayesian Nash equilibria. A notable exception is
the Nash equilibrium strategy of the original game. (JEL C91, C72)
The traveler’s dilemma was ﬁrst described by Kaushik Basu (1994) at the conference of
the American Economic Association in January 1994.1 Basu proposed this game in order
to demonstrate the conﬂict between intuition and game-theoretic reasoning in a one-shot
game. We report the results of an experiment conducted on this game as a one-shot game
participants being experts in game theory, in particular members of the Game Theory
Society.
The parable for the traveler’s dilemma (Basu, 1994, pp. 391) is the following: “Two trav-
elers returning home from a remote island, where they bought identical antiques [...],
discoverthattheairlinehasmanagedtosmashthese[...]. Theairlinemanager[...] as-
sures the passengers of adequate compensation. But since he does not know the cost of
the antique, he oﬀers the following scheme. Each of the two travelers has to write down on
a piece of paper the cost of the antique. This can be any value between 2 units of money
∗This research started while Michael Carter was visiting the University of Hohenheim. Correspondence
to J¨ org Naeve, Economics Institute 520c, University of Hohenheim, 70593 Stuttgart, GERMANY; E-Mail:
jnaeve@uni-hohenheim.de
1Some month later, roughly the same game was presented in a philosophical journal under the title
“The gingerbread game” (Martin Hollis, 1994).
1and 100 units. Denote the number chosen by traveler i by ni. If both write the same
number, that is, n1 = n2, then it is reasonable to assume that they are telling the truth (so
argues the manager) and so each of these travelers will be paid n1 (or n2) units of money.
If traveler i writes a larger number than the other ( i.e., ni >n j), then it is reasonable to
assume (so it seems to the manager) that j is being honest and i is lying. In that case the
manager will treat the lower number, that is, nj, as the real cost and will pay traveler i
the sum of nj − 2 and pay j the sum of nj +2 . T r a v e l e ri is paid 2 units less as penalty
for lying and j is paid 2 units more as reward for being so honest in relation to the other
traveler.”
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(x +2 ,x− 2) if x<y
(x,x)i f x = y
(y − 2,y+2 ) i fx>y
.
If both players had to conﬁne their choice to 2 or 3, the structure of the 2×2 payoﬀ matrix
of this reduced game would be identical with the prisoner’s dilemma.
In this game, there is a unique Nash equilibrium, namely (2,2). Furthermore, as Basu
argues, (2,2) is not only the unique Nash equilibrium, but also strict and the only ratio-
nalizable equilibrium.2
So it seems that game theoretic reasoning gives a clear cut answer to what should be
expected in the traveler’s dilemma. However, as Basu states: “All intuition seems to mili-
tate against all formal reasoning in the traveler’s dilemma. Hence the traveler’s dilemma
seems to be one of the purest embodiments of the paradox of rationality in game theory
because it eschews all unnecessary features, like play over time or the nonstrictness of the
equilibrium” (Basu, 1994, p. 391).
The aim of our paper is twofold. First we investigate experimentally how experts actually
play this game. Given that they did not act as predicted by Nash equilibrium, we then set
out to ﬁnd a theoretical argument which may explain the paradox.
Participants in the experiment reported on here were game theorists, in particular members
of the Game Theory Society, who played one instance of a one-shot traveler’s dilemma.
We conducted the experiment eliciting the strategies participants chose in the one-shot
traveler’s dilemma and the beliefs they held about the average of the strategies played by
the other participants. In the ﬁrst part of this paper (Sections I. and II.), we describe
2An equilibrium is strict, if it is a combination of mutual unique best replies. Rationalizability was
introduced independently by B. Douglas Bernheim (1984) and David G. Pearce (1984). Being the only
rationalizable equilibrium means, that it is also the unique strategy combination surviving iterated elimi-
nation of strictly dominated strategies (Pearce, 1984, Lemma 3, p. 1048).
2the experiment in detail. In the second part (Section III.) the results are confronted with
the predictions we get from assuming equilibrium behavior in an incomplete information
version of the traveler’s dilemma. Finally, we discuss related literature and conclude with
possible lines of further research.
I. Description of the Experiment
In order to generate a sample of ‘experts’, participation was limited to members of the Game
Theory Society. An invitation to participate was emailed to all members ﬁve weeks before
the closing date of July 15, 2002. The email referred recipients to a web site containing
full details of the competition3 and an online entry form. The site was protected, with the
password given in the email. A reminder was sent two weeks before the closing date.
To ensure that participants were indeed members of the Game Theory Society they were
required to disclose their name and email address, with the option to indicate whether
they wanted their identity to be kept conﬁdential. A list of all entrants was sent to the
secretary of the Society who checked their eligibility.
Participants were required to submit their own strategy for the one-shot traveler’s dilemma
and their assessment of the average of the strategies submitted by the other participants,
knowing that the other participants were also members of the Game Theory Society.
Specifying beliefs about the average strategy of the other players required specifying a
probability distribution over the strategy space {2,3,...,100}. To enable this, the online
entry form provided 99 boxes labeled 2,3,...,100, in which the participant could write
expected probability or frequency of each pure strategy. The instructions to participants
said:
• There is no need to specify a probability weight for every cell. Missing entries are
assumed to be zero.
• The probability weights do not have to sum to one. It suﬃces to assign an integer
to each pure strategy in the support of your distribution, with the size of the integer
proportional to its relative probability. We will normalize each distribution prior to
computation.
A similar set of 99 boxes were provided for the participant to enter his or her strategy. A
pure strategy could be speciﬁed by entering a single number in the appropriate box. A
mixed strategy could be speciﬁed by entering probability weights to each pure strategy in
the support, just as in specifying beliefs.
3It also included a reference to Basu (1994), since we assumed most potential participants to be aware
of that paper, anyways. Consequently, we presented the game along with Basu’s fable.
3To facilitate the entry of beliefs (and mixed strategies), some simple tools were provided,
enabling the participant
• to enter a constant value over any interval
• to linearly interpolate over any interval
• to shift the values over any interval either up or down by a speciﬁed amount.
Furthermore, the strategy and beliefs speciﬁed by the participant were depicted graphically,
with plots showing the implied density and cumulative distribution functions. The tools
could be used interactively, allowing the participant to modify his or her entry and view
the resulting changes on the graphs.
When the participant indicated that he or she was satisﬁed with the speciﬁcation by
submitting their entry, the information provided was echoed back to the participant to
enable him or her to conﬁrm the entry before it was ﬁnally recorded.
To provide an incentive to think about beliefs as well as strategy, separate prizes were
awarded for the accuracy of beliefs and the eﬀectiveness of the strategy. Winners of both
prizes were determined randomly, by drawing numbered balls from an urn.4 We adopted
random selection to avoid perverse incentive eﬀects. For example, if we selected the winner
of the belief prize on the basis of accuracy of his or her beliefs, we felt there was some
chance that players might manipulate their strategies in an attempt to win the belief
game. Similarly, if winning the strategy game depended on the eﬀectiveness of the strategy,
players might seek to maximize the probability of winning rather than maximize expected
payoﬀ. Transaction costs precluded the simple alternative of rewarding every participant
with his average payoﬀ.
The randomly chosen winner of the strategy game received twenty times the expected
payoﬀ of his or her strategy when pitted against the strategies submitted by the other
contestants. The prize awarded to the randomly chosen winner of the belief game was
proportional to the accuracy of his or her beliefs. We measured the accuracy of beliefs by
summing the absolute diﬀerences between the player’s estimated distribution function F
and the actual distribution G of the strategies submitted by all other players, normalized




i=2 |Fi − Gi|
98
Since we did not know in advance what scores might be achieved, we determined the value
of the prize as that fraction of $1000 that the winner’s score bore to highest score of all
4The draw was made by Hans-Peter Liebig, designated Rector of the University of Hohenheim on 26
July 2002. The actual prizes were $970 and $1693 respectively.
4contestants. That is




where score is the belief accuracy of the prize-winner (chosen at random) and highest is
the score of the contestant who has the most accurate beliefs.
In addition to the monetary prizes, all participants were promised that they would be
personally informed of the results within two weeks of the closing date.
II. Results
A total of 51 entries were received.5 45 respondents submitted a pure strategy. Of these,
three proposed the Nash strategy (s = 2) and 10 submitted the cooperative strategy (s =
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Figure 1: The average of the submitted strategies.
The peaks at 31, 49 and 70 are due to three players submitting pure strategies at these
values. The full distribution of pure strategies is summarized in the following table.
The expected payoﬀ to each pure strategy when playing against the average is shown in
ﬁgure 2. We see that the best response to the average strategy is to play a pure strategy of
97. This was submitted by six entrants, giving an expected payoﬀ of 85.09 (after removing
the player’s own strategy from the average). The average expected payoﬀ over all strategies
5The invitation to participate was sent to all members of the Game Theory Society, which were around
300 at that time.
5Table 1: Distribution of pure strategies played
Strategy Entries Strategy Entries Strategy Entries
23 88 1 96 3
41 90 1 97 6
31 1 93 1 98 9
49 1 94 2 99 3
70 1 95 2 100 10
submitted was 75.23 with a standard deviation of 23.13. The worst payoﬀs went to the
Nash strategy (s = 2), which earned a paltry 3.92 on average.
The actual winner in the strategy part of the experiment played the pure strategy 99, the
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Figure 2: Payoﬀs against the average of the submitted strategies.
Of the 47 entrants who submitted both strategy and beliefs, many did an admirable job of
estimating the average strategy. Measured as described in the previous section, accuracy
scores ranged from 0.97 down to 0.12 with an average of 0.74 and standard deviation of
0.25. Although only 17 (out of 47) respondents played a best response to their own beliefs,
37 played a strategy which yielded a payoﬀ not more than one unit below the payoﬀ to their
best response. The average strategy error was 0.99 with standard deviation of 2.86. Two
players deviated signiﬁcantly from a best response to their beliefs, sacriﬁcing a signiﬁcant
fraction of their potential payoﬀ.
The actual winner in the belief part of the experiment had a score of 0.94, which means
he earned $968 = 0.94
0.97 · $1000.
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Figure 3: The average of the submitted beliefs.
III. Analysis of the Results
We will ﬁrst describe how we arrive at modeling the traveler’s dilemma as a game of incom-
plete information and state a number of results describing characteristics of Bayesian Nash
equilibria in this model. Then we will numerically calculate such equilibria, in particular
their support, for parameter values suggested by the experimental data and compare them
with the experimental results.
A. The Traveler’s Dilemma with Incomplete Information
Our analysis starts from two basic observations in the experimental data:
1. Most participants choice of strategy seems to be rational, i.e. follows a best response
logic. Indeed, we observed 17 (out of 47) playing a best response to their belief and
another 20 to get within 1 unit of what their best response would have yielded.
2. On the other hand, a substantial fraction, 10 participants, submitted the strategy
100 which cannot be explained as rational behavior in the traveler’s dilemma, since
it is strictly dominated (in fact it is the only such strategy in the game).
This suggests that it will be impossible to explain both patterns of behavior in the same
way. So it seems to be crucial to explicitly consider heterogeneity in the participants. In
our case, we are led to consider an incomplete information version of the traveler’s dilemma
in which there is an “irrational” type always playing s = 100. One might also think of
this irrational type as a cooperative type, given that the strategy combination (100,100)
7corresponds to a cooperative approach to the game.6 Hence s = 100 appears to be a
second focal point (Thomas C. Schelling, 1960) in the traveler’s dilemma, the unique Nash
equilibrium strategy 2 being the ﬁrst and most obvious.
So we assume that the population of participants consists of two diﬀerent groups: While
one of them is formed by rational players in the sense that they use a strategy forming
a best response to their belief, the other consists of irrational players choosing a certain
strategy for sure. As we have argued, the data lead us to consider at least one irrational
type who always plays s = 100.
Of course, this approach means, that strictly speaking we do no longer analyze the traveler’s
dilemma but some diﬀerent though related game of incomplete information. We do not see
any way to avoid this, however, since not using a strictly dominated strategy is among the
most direct consequences of assuming rationality. So while one might for example use the
lack of common knowledge of rationality to construct models in which rational players use
strategies other than the Nash equilibrium strategy 2, there is no hope to explain s = 100
being played.
An interesting exception are those entries playing the original game’s Nash equilibrium
strategy 2, of which we received three. Two of these gave full weight on s =2i nt h e i r
beliefs while the third put some minimal weight on s =3 ,s ot h a ts = 2 is still the best
reply to his belief. As will be demonstrated below, in the incomplete information version
of the traveler’s dilemma, 2 ceases to be a strategy that a rational player would use.
For this reason, and because we ﬁnd it hard to accept to simply ignore the observations of
the original game’s Nash equilibrium strategies in our explanation, we assume that there
are two irrational types. One always playing the cooperative strategy 100 and another
always playing the Nash equilibrium strategy 2.7
It will become obvious, that the driving force behind our results is the assumption of the
irrational cooperative type. Just a small probability for this type drastically changes the
equilibrium behavior for the rational players breaking the Nash equilibrium of the full
information game. Of course, assuming the existence of irrational 2 types, only, would not
change anything: Both rational and irrational types would then play s =2 .
6All bargaining solutions satisfying Pareto-optimality and symmetry would agree on this solution. It is
safe to assume that participants were aware of this fact. As an example, Joseph Mullat (2002) explicitly
pointed out that the Nash bargaining solution would be an obvious candidate for what players would do in
the game. Therefore, the term “irrational” should not be interpreted pejoratively. We use it in a technical
sense simply meaning “not maximizing expected utility”.
7It may sound confusing that playing the unique prediction of virtually any non-cooperative solution
to the game is called irrational, but in the incomplete information game such is the case. Alternatively,
one could think of these participants as playing the original traveler’s dilemma without considering the
possibility of other types playing high strategies. We prefer to stick to a game with incomplete information
with common priors, though.
8Formally, our model is as follows. There are three types of players, rational ones, irrational
type 100 and irrational type 2 players. We assume that the common prior probability
f o rt h e2 - t y p ei sp2 and that of the 100-type p100, hence a priori a player is rational with
probability p =1− p2 − p100.
The rational types will never use the strictly dominated strategy 100. So we denote a
mixed strategy for them by r =( r2,...,r 99). The resulting beliefs a rational player holds
over the average strategy of her opponent (who may be rational or irrational) is denoted
by q =( q2,...,q 100), with
(4) qj =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
p2 +( 1− p2 − p100)rj for j =2
(1 − p2 − p100)rj for j ∈{ 3,...,99}
p100 for j = 100.
From this we can derive a ﬁrst result showing how the existence of the irrational 100 type
leads rational players to use high strategies. The proof is deferred to Appendix B.
Claim 1 In the traveler’s dilemma with incomplete information pure strategy i is strictly









So pure strategy 2, the unique Nash equilibrium strategy in the traveler’s dilemma with
complete information, becomes dominated as soon as p100 > 0.03. In our experiment 10 of
the 51 participants played the pure strategy 100, which corresponds to p100 =0 .196. This
number is quite close to both the weight on 100 in the average strategy which is 0.206 and
the weight on 100 in the average belief which is 0.209. In any case, for p100 corresponding
to the experimental results, 2 is dominated. So, for the reasons given above, we introduce
the 2-type. The three entrants who used pure strategy 2 correspond to p2 =0 .059 which
is also the weight of 2 in the average strategy.8 Interestingly, the average belief puts a
probability of 0.173 on 2 which is almost three times as high. We attribute this diﬀerence
to the focal point character of 2, especially among game theorists. This argument lends
further support to including the 2-type in the model.
From equation 6 above, we see that for the values p2 =0 .059 and p100 =0 .196 all strategies
i ≤ 87 are dominated.9 So for any assignments of the a priori probabilities of the two
8There was exactly one other entrant putting any weight on 2, this weight was 0.001.
9For the values from the average strategy (p2 =0 .059 and p100 =0 .206) also pure strategy 88 becomes
dominates and for the values from the average belief (p2 =0 .173 and p100 =0 .209) all strategies less or
equal to 90 are dominated.
9irrational types which are in line with our data, our model suggests that the rational type
should employ fairly high strategies, which means a drastic deviation from the complete
information Nash equilibrium prediction that everybody plays s =2 .
We leave a detailed comparison of the experimental ﬁndings with the model’s predictions
to Subsection B. below. Here we brieﬂy pause to check whether Claim 1 is consistent with
our data. There remain 38 entrants we label rational players, because they played neither
2 nor 100. Of these 30 chose a strategy with support in the interval [87,99] (28 using a
pure and two a mixed strategy). The average strategy of rational players puts a weight of
0.81 on the interval [87,99].10 So both considerations indicate that the majority of rational
players conform with Claim 1. Table 2 shows the frequencies of all pure strategies played.
Values of undominated pure strategies are starred. The strategies of the two irrational
types are framed.
Table 2: Pure strategies and number of entries
Strategy Entries Strategy Entries Strategy Entries
2 3 88 1 96∗ 3
41 90 1 97∗ 6
31 1 93∗ 1 98∗ 9
49 1 94∗ 2 99∗ 3
70 1 95∗ 2 100 10
Therefore, it makes sense to consider the Bayesian Nash equilibria of our incomplete in-
formation game.11 In fact, given the symmetry of the game, we concentrate on symmetric
equilibria.
A necessary condition for r =( r2,...,r 99) to be a symmetric equilibrium is that the
expected payoﬀ of all strategies in the support of r is equal. We will denote the expected
payoﬀ of a strategy x given mixed strategy r by π(x;r).
We are going to derive certain restrictions on the form such a strategy can take in our
game. In particular, we will consider restrictions on the support of a (mixed) strategy
r which forms part of a (symmetric) Bayesian Nash equilibrium, i.e. the set of all pure
strategies in the equilibrium strategy with strictly positive weight.
10If we take the values p2 =0 .173 and p100 =0 .209, so that all strategies i ≤ 90 are dominated, there
are 2 additional rational players using a dominated pure strategy (one 88 the other 90). The total weight
of the average strategy of rational players on the interval [91,99] is 0.76.
11In fact, it looks as if only the rational type uses Bayesian updating and selects the optimal strategy
given his information, while irrational types do not. This interpretation, is misleading however: If an
irrational type always chooses the same strategy we do not have to assume he does not use Bayesian
updating. Giving him the ‘right’ payoﬀs to make ‘his’ strategy dominant, results in him choosing it as
optimal for any given belief, i.e. also for any possible result of Bayesian updating.
10The ﬁrst follows from Claim 1 above. Since dominated strategies cannot be in the support
of an equilibrium strategy, this result gives a lower bound for the support. The following
claim shows that by introducing the 100-type with suﬃciently high a priori probability
p100 means that very high strategies, namely 97, 98 or 99, have to be in the equilibrium
support which is also in line with experimental evidence. Again, the proof can be found in
Appendix B.
Claim 2 For p100 ≥
3(1−p2)
100 the support of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium must contain 97,
98 or 99.
Our empirical values for p100 and p2 satisfy the conditions of Claim 2 even if we take the
lowest values for p100 =0 .196 (the percentage of participants playing pure strategy 100)
and p2 =0 .059 (the percentage of participants playing pure strategy 2).
There are multiple symmetric equilibria in the game. Here we shall focus on one particular
equilibrium, however, which has the following properties.
• The support is connected, i.e. an interval.
• The equilibrium is Pareto optimal among those with interval support.
It turns out that it follows from these requirements that the support of the equilibrium
strategies has to contain 99.
Claim 3 For any Pareto optimal Bayesian Nash equilibrium with interval support, the
support contains 99.
B. Equilibrium Behavior Compared to Experimental Results
Since we conducted a one-shot experiment, the only clear cut test of whether a reported
strategy is consistent with a Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategy is to check whether its
support is contained in the support of the equilibrium strategy. In particular, any pure
strategy from the support could be interpreted as the result of drawing from the equilibrium
mixed strategy.
The support of the Pareto eﬃcient interval equilibrium strategy is the interval [94,99].
This strategy, or more precisely the resulting frequencies of pure strategies chosen by the
rational and the irrational types, is depicted in ﬁgure 4.
Excluding the three playing 2 (2-type) and the ten using the cooperative strategy (100-
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Figure 4: The equilibrium frequencies
strategy in the interval [94,99] and 2 used a mixed strategy with support [94,99]. Overall,
our model is consistent with the behavior of 27 of the 38 rational entrants.
Three of the remaining 11 used undominated strategies. We regard the remaining players
as outliers of some sort, and feel that our model does quite well to explain the behavior of
the rational participants.
Another question is whether the reported beliefs support our modelling of the game. So far
we have used beliefs just to argue that most participants were playing rationally in following
a best response logic albeit for many of them the strategies were just approximately best
responses. Considering the average belief, there is a higher weight on 2 than should follow
from prior beliefs according to strategy choices (0.173 as opposed to 0.059). The weight on
100 almost coincides (0.206 in average strategy or 0.196 in percentage of participants using
pure strategy 100 against 0.209 in the average belief). There is, however, an aggregate
weight of 0.281 outside the equilibrium support [94,99] and still 0.219 outside [87,94] the
set of strategies which are not dominated.
Beliefs are more problematic. While the aggregate belief does not necessarily contradict
the model, individual beliefs are very heterogeneous. To support an equilibrium, it is not
enough that beliefs have the right support. While one can argue that any pure strategy in
the support can be the result of a random draw according to the equilibrium distribution, if
this is how participants arrived at their strategy choices, they should have reported beliefs
that are equilibrium beliefs.
So our reading of the experiment is that average beliefs are much closer to model predictions
than individual ones. Despite beliefs not ﬁtting the equilibrium predictions of the model,
individual behavior can be explained quite well by it.
12IV. Connections with Related Literature
One participant, Nimrod Megiddo (2002), pointed out that the traveler’s dilemma can be
viewed as a form of ﬁnitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma. From this perspective, our model
of an incomplete information version of the traveler’s dilemma seems to directly translate
to the model of David M. Kreps et.al. (1982) for the prisoner’s dilemma. Their basic
idea is to explain the high number of rounds with cooperation by rational players in 100
repetitions of the prisoner’s dilemma by introducing an irrational cooperative type, which
makes it rational to imitate this type until quite near the end of the game leading to the
cooperative payoﬀ. However, even if the basic modeling strategy is the same, the economic
interpretation is diﬀerent, since imitation cannot occur in a one shot game.
Robert J. Aumann’s shows that in the 100-times repeated prisoner’s dilemma, allowing
for a breakdown in the mutuality of knowledge of players’ rationality at some level can
account for keeping up cooperative behavior “until at least the 85th or the 90th stage, and
even beyond” (Aumann, 1992, p. 222). While this appears to be related to our result that
the strategies chosen by most rational players are in the high nineties, it cannot explain
the ten entries using the strictly dominated pure strategy 100.
C. Monika Capra et.al. (1999) run a repeated traveler’s dilemma as a laboratory experi-
ment with students from economic classes in order to investigate, whether average claims
are aﬀected by the (theoretically irrelevant) changes in the penalty/reward parameter.
Their work shows that the Nash equilibrium strategy solution is a rather bad predictor
of how people play the repeated traveler’s dilemma. Exploiting the dynamic structure of
the repeated game, they develop a logit learning model in which players are assumed to
start with a uniform prior and use a simple counting rule to update their beliefs. These
beliefs determine expected payoﬀs and these in turn determine players choice probabilities.
This model seems to be able to reproduce the qualitative features of observed adjustment
patterns in the multi-stage game and the inverse relationship between the penalty/reward
parameter and average claims. It is important to stress that the focus in their work is very
diﬀerent from ours. While they are mainly interested in learning during repeated plays of
the game and hence do not have to take the initial uniform prior too seriously, we focus
on the one shot game and thus our explanation hinges on players initial beliefs.
The logit learning model is complemented by considering the quantal response equilibrium
proposed by Richard D. McKelvey and Thomas R. Palfrey (1995) and advocated in Jakob
K. Goeree and Charles A. Holt (1999) which has been successfully used to explain data
from many diﬀerent experiments. An analogous concept for games continuous strategy
spaces is the logit equilibrium developed by Simon P. Anderson et.al. (2002). Goeree
et.al. (2004) have proposed regular quantal response equilibria. Philip A. Haile et.al.
(2003) have questioned the empirical content of quantal response equilibrium claiming
that by choosing appropriate parameters it can explain any possible behavior. Of course,
13our explanation is subject to the same general criticism. By choosing the right irrational
types with appropriate probabilities, it could also explain any given data.
Capra et.al. (2003) study one-shot traveler’s dilemma games using an introspective pro-
cedure that is similar in spirit to the idea behind the quantal response equilibrium. They
also show, that this approach can also explain data of treatments in which players receive
a common advice which becomes common knowledge.
Of course, quantal response equilibrium is not the only explanation that has been put
forward to explain experimentally observed behavior in the traveler’s dilemma. Closest
to ours is Mathias Erlei (2004), who in a broader context proposes to consider what he
calls heterogeneous social preferences. In addition to rational players (SE-players in his
terminology) he considers inequity averse (IE) and welfare oriented (WP) players. In the
traveler’s dilemma with small penalty/reward as considered by Goeree and Holt (2001, p.
1405–06)12, he ﬁnds that there exists a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which WP-Players
play 300 while rational players use a mixed strategy with support in the upper end of the
strategy space [291,299]. All types using the lowest strategy available is another Bayesian
Nash equilibrium, however (cf. Erlei, 2004, Result 2, p. 16).
Goeree and Holt (2004) propose yet another approach to analyze behavior, namely noisy
introspection. Their idea is somewhat related to the idea to consider limited levels of
mutual knowledge of rationality. Their model puts some noise in the process of iterated
formation of conjectures about each others’ decisions and beliefs.
Finally, to return to the source of the traveler’s dilemma, Basu (1994) in his discussion of the
paradox described three possible ‘lines of attack’. Our model probably suggests to further
study the second one, which is to analyze where the two assumptions of rational behavior
in the sense of best response and common knowledge of rationality “may by themselves
be inconsistent” (Basu, 1994, p. 394). At least, introducing the 100-type and therefore
dispensing common knowledge of rationality (in the original full information game) helped
to explain observed behavior.
V. Conclusions
What distinguishes our experiment from other experiments on the traveler’s dilemma re-
ported in the literature is that the participants were experts in game theory. Therefore,
the fact that our results conﬁrm the general ﬁndings that the behavior in experiments is far
from the Nash equilibrium prediction indicates that these ﬁndings should not be attributed
to any lack of understanding the game but rather represent a robust pattern of behavior.
12They take the strategy space to be {180,...,300} and consider a version with small penalty/reward
(5) and one with high penalty/reward (180).
14Our analysis shows that introducing incomplete information allows for a fairly good ex-
planation of the data from our experiment. This would seem to partially contradict the
claim by Goeree and Holt (2001) that standard game theory cannot explain the data from
experiments on the one-shot traveler’s dilemma with small claims. However, this is not
strictly true, since what we analyze is not Basu’s original traveler’s dilemma but rather
a game of incomplete information in which most players have the payoﬀ matrix of the
traveler’s dilemma.
What we cannot explain at all using classical game theoretic analysis, however, is the
motivation of those ‘irrational’ participants who chose the strictly dominated strategy
100. This choice cannot be explained either, by invoking some kind of breakdown in
the mutuality of knowledge of rationality as in Aumann (1992). It is however a robust
feature of all experiments on the traveler’s dilemma, that with a comparable size of the
reward/penalty, the cooperative strategy is used quite often (cf. Ariel Rubinstein, 2004).
It may be interesting to note that the irrational 100-types provide a kind of public good
to all players in the game: Without them, everybody would end up in the Nash equilib-
rium with payoﬀ 2, while the payoﬀs to all types are much higher in the Bayesian Nash
equilibrium of the incomplete information game. This clearly distinguishes the traveler’s
dilemma from the prisoner’s dilemma.
The main feature of our results is the heterogeneity of players. Only the experimental
evidence that a number of participants played a strictly dominated strategy led us to
introduce the irrational 100-type. Similarly, a suﬃciently large fraction of players who use
any other high strategy, say s = 99, would lead to qualitatively the same results by inducing
Bayesian Nash equilibria with support in the high end of the strategy space. At the same
time, using such a strategy could be reconciled with rationality in the sense of playing a
best response by considering heterogeneity in the beliefs. To arrive at these however, we
cannot assume all players to continue the chain of reasoning prescribed by the concept of
rationalizability. However, assuming they stop at a certain level (cf. Rosemarie Nagel, 1995,
Dale O. Stahl II, 1993, and Stahl and Paul W. Wilson, 1994, 1995) can generate diﬀerent
beliefs. Again, just a certain fraction of players who are not inﬁnitely rational would suﬃce
to explain a markable deviation from Nash equilibrium behavior by the others.
Appendix A: Playing all others versus playing their average
We evaluated entrants strategies by computing their expected payoﬀ against the average
strategy of their opponents. This section just reminds that this is equivalent to assigning
to each strategy the expected payoﬀ from a round robin tournament.
Let the set of participants be I = {1,2,...,n}⊂N.
In the game there are two players, 1 and 2; their roles are ﬁlled by the participants in a
tournament, i.e. each participant having given a strategy for role of player 1 is matched
15exactly once with any other participant in the role of player 2.
We are comparing the average of her payoﬀs in those matches against playing once against
a strategy for player 2 that is the average of the other participants’ strategies for that role.
Denote the pure strategies for player 1 by K = {1,...¯ k}⊂N. and those for player 2 by
L = {1,...¯ l}⊂N.
In the traveler’s dilemma, we have ¯ k = ¯ l, so actually in our case both strategy sets are
equal.
Payoﬀs for a pair (k,l) of pure strategies are denoted by π(k,l)=( π1(k,l),π 2(k,l)).















(in general, of course, entries
would have to consist of a pair of strategies, one for player 1, and one for player 2).
We pick a participant ˆ ı ∈ I who is player 1. Let J−ˆ ı ⊆ I denote the subset of participants
we consider as possible opponents, i.e. all participants who could ﬁll player 2’s role, when
ˆ ı is player 1 (typically, J−ˆ ı = I or, as in our case, J−ˆ ı = I \{ ˆ ı}).

















































If on the other hand, she plays against each one of her possible opponents, the average












































Therefore π =˜ π.
16Appendix B: Proofs of the claims
This section gathers the proofs of Claims 1, 2, and 3.
P r o o fo fC l a i m1 :
Claim 1 states that in the traveler’s dilemma with incomplete information pure strategy i









To see this, let r be the rational types’ strategy and q the resulting beliefs. The payoﬀ







j=3 qj · 4+p100 · 4i f i =2 ,
 i−1
j=2 qj · (j − 2) + qi · i +
  99
j=i+1 qj + p100
 
· (i +2 ) i fi ∈{ 3,...,99}.
Therefore the payoﬀ diﬀerence between the strategy 99 and pure strategy 2 is
(11)
π(99) − π(2) =
− q2 · 2+
98  
j=3
qj [(j − 2) − (2 + 2)] + q99 [99 − (2 + 2)] + p100 [(99 + 2) − (2 + 2)].
The payoﬀ diﬀerence between the strategy 99 and pure strategy i =3 ,...98 is
(12)
π(99) − π(i)= qi [(i − 2) − i]+
98  
j=i+1
qj [(j − 2) − (i +2 ) ]
+ q99 [99 − (i +2 ) ]+p100 [(99 + 2) − (i +2 ) ].
So in general the payoﬀ diﬀerence between the strategy 99 and pure strategy i =2 ,...98
can be written as
(13) π(99) − π(i)=−2qi +
98  
j=i+1
qj(j − i − 4) + q99(97 − i)+p100(99 − i).
Pure strategy i is dominated by 99 if and only if the payoﬀ diﬀerence in equation 13 is
positive for all admissible q, i.e. for all possible mixed strategies r of the rational type.
For all i ∈{ 2,...,97} we see from equation 13, that π(99) − π(i) is minimal for
maximal qi+1, because the coeﬃcient for qi+1 is −3 which is less than any other. This
17means ri+1 = 1 is the rational types strategy most favorable for strategy i resulting in
qi+1 =( 1− p2 − p100). So for 99 to dominate i we must have
(1 − p2 − p100) · (−3) + p100 · (99 − i) > 0








For the strategy 98, the most favorable situation is not to have all weight on 98+1 = 99
but rather to have it on 98 itself. This is because 99 earns 99 against itself so that the
payoﬀ diﬀerence in favor of 98 is just 1, while it is 2 against 98 itself (it earns 98 while 99
is penalized and earns 98 − 2 = 96). Hence 99 dominates 98 if
(1 − p2 − p100) · (−2) + p100 > 0






















the general condition 14 implies the condition 15 and thus ensures strategy 98 to be dom-
inated.
From this observation, it may seem that it is easier for 99 to dominate 98 than 97. This
is not the case, as a comparison of the threshold values for p100 guaranteeing strategies 97
and 98, respectively, to be dominated by 99. For 97 it is p100 >
3(1−p2)
5 and for 98 it is
p100 >
2(1−p2)











whenever 98 is dominated by 99 so is 97.
P r o o fo fC l a i m2 :
The statement of this claim is that for p100 ≥
3(1−p2)
100 the support of a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium must contain 97, 98 or 99.
For values of p100 below the given threshold, there is a unique equilibrium, namely
every rational player playing 2, i.e. the Nash equilibrium of the complete information
game remains.
Let r be the (rational players’) strategy in the symmetric equilibrium and q the re-
sulting beliefs. Let X ⊆{ 2,...,99} be the support of r and let y =m a x ( X)a n d
z =m a x( X \{ y}).
18Suppose y ≤ 96. For this to be the case, we must have π(99,q)−π(y,q) ≤ 0. From our
calculations in the proof of Claim 1 above and the observation that q97 = q98 = q99 =0b y
assumption, we see that this means




Also we must have π(z,q)−π(y,q) = 0 from the fact that both are in the support of the
equilibrium strategy. Taking into account that qj = 0 for j ∈{ z+1,...y−1}∪{97,...,99}
this leads to
(19) qz ·4+qy ·(z +2−y)+p100(z −y)=0 ⇐⇒ qz =






























Since qz has to be strictly positive, this implies y>97.
If z ≤ y − 2w em u s th a v eπ(y − 1,q) − π(y,q) ≤ 0s o
(22) qy · 1+p100 · (−1) ≤ 0 ⇐⇒ qy ≤ p100.
Together with equation 18 this implies







⇐⇒ y ≥ 97. (23)
P r o o fo fC l a i m3 :
The claim we want to prove is that the support of any Pareto optimal Bayesian Nash
equilibrium with interval support contains 99.
Since for interval equilibria we are in the ﬁrst case of the proof of Claim 2, it is clear,
that the support must contain 98.
Suppose r is an equilibrium with support [x,98] that is an interval not containing 99.
Then there is a corresponding equilibrium with support [x+1,99] and equilibrium strategy
r  given by r 
i = ri−1 (which also means q (i)=q(i − 1) for all i ∈ [x +1 ,99]).
19To see this consider the conditions for r being an equilibrium with support [x,98].
These are two, namely that all strategies in the support give the same payoﬀ, i.e. for all
i ∈ [x,98]
π(i) − π(98) = 0 ⇐⇒ qi · 4+
97  
j=i+1
qj(i − j +4 )+q98(i +2− 98) = 0. (24)
and that the payoﬀ to all strategies below x is less or equal to that of x, i.e. for all j<x
π(j) − π(x) ≤ 0 ⇐⇒ qx · 2+
98  
i=x+1
qi(j − x)+p100(j − x) ≤ 0. (25)
Now consider r  deﬁned above. It follows for all i  ∈ [x +1 ,99] that
π(i
 ) − π(99) = q
 






  − j +4 )+q
 
99(i
  +2− 99)




  − j +4 )+q98
 
(i
  − 1) + 2 − 98
 











  − 1) + 2 − 98
 
(26)
But equation 26 is just equation 24 as can be seen by replacing i  − 1w i t hi.
Similarly, for all j  <x+1w eh a v e
π(j















  − (x +1 )
 











  − 1) − x
 
(27)
But equation 27 is just equation 25 as can be seen by replacing j  − 1b yj.
Considering the payoﬀ to pure strategy 98 with beliefs q generated by r and that of 99
with beliefs q  generated by r  one immediately sees that r  yields a higher payoﬀ than r.
π(99,q






  − 2) + q
 
99 · 99 + p100 · 101







(i − 2) + 1
 
+ q98(98 + 1) + p100(100 + 1)





qi(i − 2) + q98 · 98 + p100 · 100 + 1(1 − p2)
= π(98,q)+1 ( 1− p2).
20Appendix C: Calculation of Bayesian Nash equilibria
In general, there are many Bayesian Nash equilibria of the traveler’s dilemma with incom-
plete information. We select the Pareto optimal interval equilibrium as a focal point, since
it can be computed by a simple recursive system.
By Claim 3, the support of the Pareto optimal interval equilibrium contains 99. Let x
denote the lower element of the support. Since it is an interval equilibrium, every pure
strategy between x and 99 must have the same payoﬀ. That is, the equilibrium strategy r




π(x +1 ,r)=π(x,r) (28)
which is equivalent to the system
p100 =2q98 + q99
p100 =2q97 + q98 − q99
p100 =2q96 + q97 − q98 − q99
. . .
p100 =2qx + qx+1 − qx+2 ···−q96 − q97 − q98 − q99 (29)
Given a value for q99, this system can be solved recursively for q98, q97, and so on. Put
diﬀerently, once q99 has been determined, the remaining non-zero probabilities follow inex-
orably from the requirement to maintain indiﬀerence between adjacent strategies. Further
note that the ﬁrst equation puts a restriction on q99,n a m e l y
(30) q98 > 0= ⇒ q99 <p 100





Substituting the above recursion, it can be shown that the distribution function reduces to
(32) F(x)=axp100 + bxq99
with 0 <a 99 <a 98 <...and 0 <b 99 <b 98 <b 97 <b 95 <b 94....... (The omission of b96
from the previous inequality is deliberate.)
21It follows that, for given p100, there are unique values of x and q99 <p 100 such that
(33) F(y) < 1, for every y>xand q99 and F(x)=1 .
These values deﬁne the Pareto optimal interval equilibrium. The remaining probabilities
in the support can be computed from the previous recursive system.
For the values p2 =0 .059 and p100 =0 .196 this yields q94 =0 .198, q95 =0 .174, q96 =0 .111,
q97 =0 .118, q98 =0 .052, q99 =0 .092, resulting in the equilibrium payoﬀ 89.940 whereas
the payoﬀ to pure strategy 93 is 89.395.
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